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Microdata studies of household saving often find a significant group in the population
with virtually no wealth, raising concerns about heterogeneity in motives for saving. In
particular, this heterogeneity has been interpreted as evidence againstthe life-cycle model of
saving. This paper argues that a life-cycle model can replicate observed patternsin household
wealth accumulation after accounting explicitly for precautionary saving and asset-based means-
tested social insurance. We demonstrate theoretically that social insurance programs with means
tests based on assets discourage saving by households with low expected lifetimeincome. In
addition, we evaluate the model using a dynamic programming model with four statevariables.
Assuming common preference parameters across lifetime-income groups, we areable to replicate
the empirical pattern that low-income households are more likely than high-income households
to hold virtually no wealth. Low wealth accumulation can be explained as a utility-maximizing
response to asset-based means-tested welfare programs.
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In 1990, Grace Capetillo, a single mother receiving welfare
assistance, was charged by the Milwaukee County Department of
Social Services with fraud. Her crime: Her saving account balance
exceeded $1000, the allowable asset limit for welfare recipients
(Rose, 1990).' How do programs with asset restrictions, such as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and food stamps, affect the
incentive to accumulate wealth? This paper addresses the interaction
of certain social insurance programs and saving, first in simple
theoretical models and later in a dynamic programming model with
multiple sources of uncertainty.2 We find that the interaction of a
social insurance "safety net" with uncertainty about earnings and out-
of-pocket medical expenses implies behavior that contrasts sharply
with simplified models that ignore uncertainty or social insurance
programs, or focus only on static incentive effects of these
programs. The prospect of bad realizations in future earnings or
out-of-pocket medical expenses can influence saving behavior even if
the individual never actually encounters the downturn or catastrophic
medical expense and never receives transfer payments. Hence the
impact of social insurance programs on saving behavior extends to
More recently, the Connecticut case of Cecilia Mercado and her daughter
Sandra Rosado attracted widespread media attention. Sandra saved $4900 from
part-time jobs during high school with the goal of going to college. When
officials learned of the accumulated assets, they urged Sandra to spend the
money quickly and ordered her mother to repay $9342 in AFDCbenefits that
she had received while the money was in the bank (Hays, 1992).
2Strictlyspeaking, by "social insuranceH we mean welfare programs as
opposed to such entitlement programs as Social Security or Medicare.saving behavior of potential, as well asactual, recipients.
We use a model of consumption and saving subject to
uncertainty to address an empirical "puzzle"of wealth accumulation:
As we document below, many householdsaccumulate little wealth
over their life cycle. For thosewith low lifetime earnings
(represented by educational attainment),wealth accumulation is
inconsistent with the orthodox life-cycle model; even prior to
retirement, during what are normally considered peak yearsof
wealth holding, many families hold little wealth. By contrast,
households with higher lifetime earnings exhibit savingbehavior that
is broadly consistent with the orthodox life cycle model,in the sense
that nearly every households in this group has significantwealth
accumulation near retirement.
A number of authors have examined the effects of
uncertainty on optimal intertemporal consumptionand saving
decisions.3 Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992) examine the
implications for wealth accumulation in these precautionarysaving
models, and argue that they imply too large an accumulationof
wealth. They reconcile the empirical finding that most households
accumulate little wealth with the predictions of the life-cyclemodel
'Studiesof precautionary saving in response to earnings risk include
Cantor (1985), Skinner (1988), Zeldes (1989), Kimball (1990a,b), and
Caballero (1991), among others; for comprehensive reviews of theliterature see
Deaton (1992) and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b). Studiesof
precautionary saving in response to lifetime uncertaintyinclude Yaari (1965),
Davies (1981), Skinner (1985), Abel (1986), Hubbard and Judd (1987),Hurd
(1989), and Engen (1992). Kotlikoff (1988) suggested that uncertaintyabout
medical expenses could have a large impact on precautionary savingbehavior.
2by assuming that the rate of time preferencefor most people is high
relative to the real interest rate, so that in a certainty model families
would prefer to borrow against future income. Earnings uncertainty
(and in some cases borrowing constraints) leadsindividuals to
maintain a "buffer stock" or contingency fund against income
downturns, but the impatience keeps these buffer stockssmall. This
approach offers one explanation of why so manyfamilies save little
throughout their life.
While the buffer stock model of wealth accumulation can
explain low levels of wealth, it encounters difficultyin explaining
saving behavior of those who do accumulatesubstantial assets. In
particular, the buffer stock explanation must assumethat these
families have lower rates of time preference than families that do not
accumulate wealth. We take an alternative approach, assuming that
all individuals have the same preferences, and show that the
differences in wealth of different groups can be explained bythe
interaction of uncertainty and social insurance programs with asset-
based means testing. We develop simple analytical models to
demonstrate the effects on optimal consumption of a socialinsurance
program whose eligibility depends oncurrent wealth --i.e.,one that
involves asset-based means testing. While much work hasbeen done
examining the effects on economic decisions (e.g.,labor supply) of
earnings-based means tests, little has been done examiningthe
3effects of asset-based means testing.4
Under uncertainty, asset-based means tested social insurance
programs depress saving for two distinct reasons. First,the
provision of support in the bad states of the world reduces the
uncertainty facing households, and therefore decreases precautionary
saving (this effect would be present even in the absence of the asset
test). Second, the restriction on asset holdings implies an implicit
tax of 100 percent on wealth in the event of an earnings downturn or
large medical expense. The possibility of facing this implicit tax
further reduces optimal saving.
We next show that the nonlinear budget constraint implied by
these programs leads to a nonmonotonic relationship between wealth
and consumption over certain ranges of wealth, so that an increase in
wealth can lead to a decline in consumption; in other words, the
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wealth can actually be
Sherraden (1991) is the only analysis we could find examining asset-based
means tests in welfare programs. He argues that the main effects are to reduce
participating households' ability to obtain education or training or finance the
purchase of a home, which limits the ability of these households to improve
their social standing. He also argues that the opportunity to accumulate assets
has important effects beyond the consumption that it enables, by creating an
orientation towards the future and reducing the isolation of the poor from the
economy and society.
There is also some recent work on other types of asset-based means
testing. Feldstein (1992) has shown how college financial aid scholarship rules,
which depend negatively on existing family assets, create an implicit tax on
saving. He finds empirical evidence that such rules have a significant negative
impact on wealth accumulation for eligible families. Another example occurs
when parents expect to be supported by their children in old age; each
additional dollar of wealth accumulated by parents reduces the amount of
support given to them by their children (for a theoretical model, see, for
example, O'Connell and Zeldes, 1993).
4negative over certain ranges. This result is in sharp contrast to
standard models in which consumption is always increasing in
wealth.
In general, the model cannot be solved analytically, so we
use the dynamic programming model developed in Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b) in which households face uncertainty
about earnings, out-of-pocket medical expenses, and length of life.5
We separate the population into three education (as a proxy for
lifetime-income) groups and use the empirical parameters for
earnings and out-of-pocket medical expenditures processes for each
group estimated in Hubbard, Skinner,and Zeldes (1994b). After
solving numerically for the optimal state-contingent consumption, we
draw randomly from the probability distribution of uncertain health
and earnings in each year and generate a time-series for several
thousand simulated families.
We find that the presence of means-tested social insurance
has a disproportionate impact on saving behavior of lower-lifetime-
income households. For ekample, suppose that we denote families
with total net wealth less than current income as "low wealth. Our
model predicts that, for households aged 50-59,raisingthe minimum
In that paper, we focus on aggregate saving rather than the distribution of
wealth. We find that precautionary saving is large in a realistically
parameterized life-cycle model; that is, the precautionary motive plays an
important role in determining aggregate saving. We also show that ourmodel
better replicates empirical regularities in (1) aggregate wealth and the aggregate
saving rate, (2) cross-sectional differences in consumption-age profiles by
lifetime-income group, and (3) short-run time-series properties of consumption,
income, and wealth.
5government-guaranteed level of consumption (which wecall the
consumption "floor") from $1000 to $7000 increasesthe percentage
of families with low wealth by 22.9 percent forlow-lifetime-income
households, but by only 4.4 percent among high-lifetime-income
households. That is, social insurance policies designed tomaintain
consumption have the greatest negative effect on savingfor lower
income groups. This is because the guaranteed consumptionfloor of
$7000 (identical for all education groups) represents a significantly
larger fraction of lifetime income for the populationwith low
lifetime income. We find the simulated distributions of wealth by
age match in many respectsthe actual distributions of wealth by age
documented in the United States.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present
empirical evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) on the distribution, by age and education, of U.S.household
wealth. Section III presents simple models of consumption in the
presence of social insurance and asset-based means testing.Section
IV describes our multiperiod dynamic programming model and the
empirical specification of the parameters of model. In section V, we
present the numerical results, and the simulated age-wealth patterns
are shown to mimic in certain important ways the empirical wealth
patterns discussed in section II. Section VI concludesthe paper.
6H. THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH BY AGE IN THE
UNITED STATES.
In traditional life-cycle models, asset accumulation by the
wealthy is essentially a scaled-up version of asset accumulation by
the poor. To see this, consider a life-cycle model under certainty
with time-separable homothetic (constant relative risk aversion)
preferences. Let two types of families each begin with zero assets,
have the same preferences, face the same interest rates and face age-
earnings profiles that are proportional to one another. Income in any
year for the first type of family ("high earnings") is a >1times as
great as it is for the other type ("low earnings"). Under these
assumptions, in every period consumption and accumulated assets of
the high-earnings type will be atimesas great as those of the low-
earnings type; the ratio of assets to income for the high-earnings
family will be identical to that of the low-earnings family.
Adding earnings uncertainty to the above model does not
necessarily change this result. If the probability distribution for all
future incomes is such that every possible realization of income for
the high-earnings type is atimesas great as for the low-earnings
type (but the corresponding probabilities are identical), then for
given realizations of earnings (appropriately scaled by a) over the
life cycle, both consumption and assets will be a times as great (see
Bar-Ilan, 1991). In this case, the distribution of the ratio of
accumulated assets to income will be the same for the two types of
individuals.
Suppose that unobservable lifetime earnings are related to
7educational attainment. The simple example above assumed that the
earnings of groups with high or low levels ofeducational attainment
are proportional to one another at every ageand state of the world.
In reality, the age-earnings path for college-educated workers is
more steeply sloped, and the variance of log earningsdiffers across
education groups, issues we discuss in more detail in section IV.
Still, the implication of the traditional life-cycle model is that saving
behavior of the poor and the rich should differ only to the extent that
the distribution of earnings and the age-earnings profile differ across
lifetime-earnings groups.
As we show below, the actual pattern of wealth holdings for
many households is quite different fromthe simple prediction of the
life-cycle model. Empirically, the wealth accumulation patterns for
families with lower education levels are not scaled-down versions of
the wealth patterns of families with higher levels of education. The
cross-sectional age-wealth patterns for many lower-income families
does not exhibit the "hump-shaped" profiles of wealth accumulation
predicted by the life-cycle model. By contrast, wealth-age profiles
for college-educated families display, to a greater extent, the hump-
shaped wealth-age profile consistent with life-cycle predictions.
We examine wealth holdings using the full sample of the
1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We use the 1984
PSID population weights to make the sample representative of the
8U.S. population.6 Measured wealth is equal to the sum of assets --
includingstocks, bonds, checking accounts, and other financial
assets; real estate equity; and vehicles --minusliabilities that include
home mortgages and personal debts. This measure includes
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) but excludes pension and
Social Security wealth. Wealth is generally positive, though a small
proportion of respondents reported negative wealth.7 To control
for differences in lifetime income, the sample was stratified into
three categories of education of the family head: less than twelvç
years (no high school degree), comprising 28 percent of the
weighted sample; between twelve and, fifteen years (with a high
school degree), comprising 52 percent; and sixteen years or more
years (college degree) comprising the remaining 20 percent.8
6 An alternative source would have been the Federal Reserve Board's 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances. The PSID survey was not as comprehensive as
the Survey of Consumer Finances because it did not oversample the wealthy.
According to Curtin, Juster, and Morgan (1989), however, the PSID was
surprisingly close in accuracy to the SCF except among the very wealthy.
Negative wealth was truncated at -$20,000 for three individuals. In a
number of cases, respondents did not reply to questions about wealth holdings
of specific assets. In these cases, the interviewer attempted to bracket the
amount of assets by asking sequential questions: e.g.,areyour stock holdings
$10,000 or more; if not, are they $1000 or more, etc. We estimated the assets
of those who fell within particular brackets to be equal to the average holdings
within the same bracket of those who provided exact answers. Note that
because the sample was linked to earnings data during 1983-87, we exclude
from the sample families who experienced major compositional changes during
this period.
S An alternative approach to using education as a proxy for lifetime income
would be to stratify by average earnings during the sample period. Such an
approach is probably less accurate than using education; current earnings may
(continued...)
9Scatter diagrams of the wealth holdings by age for these
three groups, presented in Figures 1(a) -1(c),emphasize the sharp
differences in wealth accumulation patterns. To adjust for
differences in population weighting, each observation is "jittered" by
placing dots (equal in number to the population weight) randomly
around the family's reported wealth.9 Quintile regressions that
estimate the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles of wealth holdings
as a cubic function of age are superimposed on eachof the graphs.
Under the simple homothetic model above, wealth holdings
will be proportional to lifetime income. To evaluate this hypothesis,
we have adjusted the vertical axis in Figures 1(a) -1(c)to correct
for differences in lifetime resources. To do this, we calculate a
simple measure of "permanent income": the constant annual real
flow of consumption that the average life-cycle household could
afford given the education-specific profile of after-tax earnings,
Social Security payments, and pensions between age 21 and 85
(assuming a real rate of interest of 3 percent).'° For those with the
8(.. .continued)
not be a good predictor of future earnings, nor is information on past earnings
always available for retirees.
For example, an observation with a weight of unity would yield a single
dot in the graph, while an observation with a weight of ten would result in ten
dots randomly arrayed around the sample observation. The graphs are
produced using the "jitter" option in STATA.
'°
Equivalently,this number may be viewed as "amortized' lifetime income,
since it has the same present value as actual earnings and retirement income.
The estimating equations used to calculate average earnings and retirement
income can be found in Appendix A of Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (l994b).
10Notes to Figures 1(a) - 1(c): Predicted 20th through 80th percentiles of the wealth
distribution, expressed as cubic polynomials in age, are also shown. The vertical axis
measures the ratio of reported individual net wealth to (education-specific) average
permanent income. Average permanent income for those without high school
degrees is $1 7,241, for high school graduates $22,244, and for college graduates
$32,062. The maximum (dollar) wealth level shown at the top of the vertical axis is
thirteen times permanent income.

















Figure Ib: Net Wealth by Age, 1984 PSID: High School Degree








Agelowest educational attainment, the level of "permanent income" is
$17,241, for high school graduates, $22,244, and for college
graduates, $32,062. Thus, lifetime earnings are approximately
twice as high for college graduates as for those with no high school
degree. Wealth is plotted as a multiple of this measure of permanent
income. A wealth corresponding to 3.0 among college graduates,
for example, is equivalent to $96,186 in net wealth. We truncate the
graphed wealth distribution at 13 times the benchmark income level
for each education group to promote legibility of the graphs (the
truncated values are shown, also jittered, along the top of the
respective graph).'1
Begiiming first with Figure 1(a), the cross-sectional evidence
indicates that, over the life cycle, many households without high
school degrees own very little wealth, even during the ten years
prior to retirement that would normally correspond to years in which
wealth is highest. The 40th percentile of net wealth for this group is
less than $20,000 at all age groups. High school graduates, in
Figure 1(b), accumulate a moderate amount of wealth. The wealth
accumulation pattern of college-educated households appears most
consistent with the life-cycle model; by ages 50 and beyond, very
few households hold less than $50,000 in net household wealth. Of
course, inferring life-cycle patterns from cross sectional data is
speculative, but Figures 1(a)-1(c) lend support to the notion that
"Thus, as marked in brackets on the vertical axis, the highest level of
wealth graphed for those without a high school degree is $244,120 (13 x
$17,241), while the highest level of wealth graphed for those with a college
degree is $416,803.
11typical wealth accumulation patterns, differ substantially by lifetime
income.'2
Detailed wealth holdings by age and by education are shown
in Table 1, with all averages weighted by the PSID family weights.
Median household wealth is shown both inclusive of and exclusive of
housing equity, where housing equity is calculated as the market
value of the house less the outstanding mortgage balance. Median
income measures labor income, transfer income (including food
stamps), pension income, and Social Security benefits for the family
head and spouse. Simple ratios of median wealth or median non-
housing wealth to median income suggest sharp differences in asset
accumulation patterns across educational groups for older age
groups. For the lowest education group at ages 50-59,for example,
median nonhousing wealth is only about half of the median income.
By contrast, median nonhousing wealth is twice median income for
households headed by college graduates.
To examine the wealth distribution further, we calculate the
percentage of households with net total wealth less than one year's
income. This is an arbitrary but convenient measure of "low
wealth" households. Table 1 shows that, for younger households,
households with less net wealth than current income constitute he
vast majority of each education group, ranging from three-fourths
among college-educated households to nearly seven-eighths among
households without a high school degree. For older cohorts, the
differences in wealth holdings become more apparent. Virtually all
12Thisresult is consistent with the findings of Bernheim and Scholz (1993).
12Source:
Note:
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 1984.
College Degree
'Wealth 'C Income' reports the weigbted paceinp of the ample with re worth (SIudinj
housing equity) less than afier-ta mt ti of asset ircont. Similarly, 'Noithousing wealth C
Incomet2' reports the weighS perceruge of the sample with mrthousing wealth less than ott-
halfof incomeas deluS above. All fln are in 1984 dollars.
Table 1: Median Wealth and Income, By AgeandEducation,1984
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Median Wealth ($) 650 13,450 20,000 44,000 36,800 28,000
MedianNonhousing
Wealth ($)
605 3,000 5,500 11,500 7,500 7,800
Median Income ($) 10,800 17,000 19,954 20,792 8,860 5,936
Wealth C Income (%) 86.3 68.3 50.7 30.0 29.6 25.0
Nonhousing Wealth
C Income/2 (%)
86.1 79.9 75.2 49.8 40.7 39.7
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Median Wealth ($) 11,00054,700 113.000 179,000 157,000 115,500
Median Nonhousing
Wealth ($)
8,300 17,600 41,000 96,000 83,000 57,760
Median Income ($) 26,00037,000 47,476 48,000 29,264 18,200
Wealth C Income (%) 74.9 38.4 22.9 4.6 0.4 0
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604 238 205 148 101households aged above 50 and with a college degree hold wealth
greater than or equal to one year'sincome. For those without a high
school degree, at least 25 percent of every age group hold net wealth
• less than currentincome. An intermediate pattern holds for high
school graduates. The percentage of households with nonhousing
wealth below one-half of current income (a measure that abstracts
from illiquid home ownership) follows much the same pattern,
although there are a larger absolute number of households who hold
less than half of a year's income in nonhousing wealth.
To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests strongly that
wealth accumulation patterns differ by lifetime income. We briefly
consider four potential explanations for this differential pattern of
wealth accumulation.
First, with a bequest motive it is plausible that households
with higher lifetime income hold more assets, especially later in life,
because they plan to leave bequests. Those with lower lifetime
income are mOre likely to find the bequest motive inoperativesince
they expect their children to do better economically (Peldstein,1988;
Laitner, 1990). The absence of 'negative bequests" for currently
low-income households introduces a corner solution, and hence
skewness in the distribution of bequests. In addition, individuals
with higher levels of educational attainment may receive greater
inheritances to the extent that lifetime income is correlated across
generations.
The problem with this explanation is that for those withlow
lifetime income, wealth accumulation is far below even that
13predicted by traditional (certainty) life-cycle models. As we discuss
below, the life-cycle model predicts at least a modest degree of
wealth accumulation to provide for retirement. However, the fact
that median nonhousing wealth for the lowest education group is
only one-half of income for households prior to retirement (those
aged 50-59)suggeststhat the life-cycle model does not fhlly capture
the saving patterns of this group.
Second, wealth accumulation across education groups may
also differ because of differences in the shape of the earnings profile,
or in the degree to which Social Security, private pensions .u d
other transfers replace earnings in retirement (as mentioned above).
For example, since Social Security benefits equal a larger fraction of
average earnings for lower-income workers, such families would not
need to save as much relative to higher income workers to ensure
adequate consumption during retirement.
As we show below, this explanation alone cannot explain
more than a small fraction of the difference in wealth distributions.
While lower-income households benefit from the higher earnings
replacement rates in Social Security benefits, higher-income (in our
case, college graduate) families are more likely to receive private
pensior.s. College-educated households should, moreover, save less
relative to income in early years in a life-cycle model because of
their more steeply sloped earnings path.
The third possible explanation for the difference in the
wealth distribution is variation in rates of time preference by
education group. Lawrance (1991), for example, has estimated that
14college-educated households have lower rates of time preference than
lower-income, non-college-educated households. Hence the
difference in wealth accumulation could just be the result of different
preferences. The lower-income households save little because of
their higher rate of time preference, while the higher-income
households (or those who are sufficiently patient to attend college)
save more.
The Lawrance estimates are based on (food) consumption
growth in the PSID during the 1970s and early 1980s. She found
that consumption of college-educated households grew faster than
that of non-college-educated households, leading her to conclude that
college-educated-households have lower rates of time preference.
However, Dynan (1993) has shown that this faster growth may have
been the consequence of the rapid rise of income for college-
educated relative to non-college-educated households. Dynan finds
little difference across education groups in the estimated rate of time
preference once income changes have been accountedfor)3 While
we view differences in rates of time preference as a potentially
important factor in wealth accumulation, it seems unlikelythat
variation in preferences alone can explain the large cross-sectional
differences in wealth accumulation.'4
'Fuchs(1982) attempted to discern differences in time preference rates by
direct survey methods, but he did not find any consistent patterns across
education groups.
There are some additional explanations which we have not fully explored.
The first is a more general (nonhomothetic) utility function, such as one that
(continued...)
15The fourth possible explanation is that, in the presence of
significant uncertainty about earnings and medical expenditures,
lower-income households may rationally accumulate proportionately
less than higher-income households because of the existence of an
asset-based means-tested social insurance "safety net." This
approach follows two strands in the previous literature. Kotlikoff
(1988) used simulations to show that a Medicaid program reduced
precautionary saving against uncertain medical expenses, while Levin
(1990) focused on the impact of Medicaid on the demand for health
insurance depending on initial wealth or income.'5 Our work
builds on these two insights in a general dynamic programming
model of uncertainty, and we pursue it below.
III.OPTIMAL CONSUMP'HON WITH TRANSFER
PROGRAMS
We begin this section by writing down our general
multiperiod model with multiple sources of uncertainty. We then
examine simplified versions including a two-period model under
14(.continued)
includes a subsistence level of consumption or a varying interternporal elasticity
of substitution (Atkeson and Ogaki, 1991). Second, length of life and/or age of
retirement may differ across education groups. Third, attainable rates of return
may be higher for high education or income groups (Yitzhaki, 1987). For
further discussion, see Masson (1988).
Levin (1990) studied how uncertainty about medical expenses and the
Medicaid program affected the demand for health insurance rather than saving.
His empirical results provide evidence on the demand for insurance a (function
of the second derivative) rather than on precautionary saving (a function of the
third derivative).
16certainty and under uncertainty. In these examples, we show how
the existence of a minimum level of consumption guaranteed by
(asset-based) means-tested social insurance programs affects the
optimal consumption choice. Later in the paper, we use numerical
methods to examine optimal consumption and wealth accumulation in
the general multiperiod model.
A. The Consumer's Optimization Problem
We assume that the household maximizes expected lifetime
utility, given all of the relevant constraints. At each age t,alevel of
consumption is chosen which maximizes:
>D5U(C)/(l+ (1)
subject to the transition equation:
A5 = + r)+ E5TR5 —M
—
C5 (2)
plus the additional constraints that:
A5 ￿0,vs. (3)
Equation (1) indicates that consumption excluding medical
spending C is chosen to maximize expected lifetime utility (where E,
isthe expectations operator conditional on information at time t),
discounted based on a rate of time preference c5. To account for
random date of death D, is a state variable that is equal to one if the
individual is alive and zero otherwise, and T is the maximum
possible length of life. The family begins period .c with assets from
the previous period plus accumulated interest, A (1 +r),whereris
17the nonstochastic real after-tax rate of interest. It then receives
exogenous earnings E, pays out exogenous necessary medical
expenses M5, and receives government transfers TR. It is left with:
X =A1(1+r) + — M5+TR3, (4)
which, following Deaton (1991), we denote as "cash on hand."
Given X3, consumption is chosen, and what remains equals
end-of-period assets, A5. We assume that no utility is derived per se
from medical expenditures; the costs are required only to offset the
damage brought upon by poor health.'6 The borrowing and
terminal constraints in equation (3) prevent negative assets in any
period. '
Transfersreceived depend on financial assets, earnings, and
medical expenses:
TR= TR(E5, M5, A5_,(1 +r)). (5)
Thisgeneral form allows transfer programs to include earnings-based
and wealth-based means testing, as well as payments tied to medical
expenses. For simplicity, we consider the following
Kotlikoff (1988) considers alternative models of health expenditures.
"Inthe parameterizations of our model under uncertainty, the maximum
realization of medical expenses is always greater than the minimum possible
earnings realization; i.e., the minimum net earnings thaw in any period is
negative. In the case when C is set to zero, and the utility function is such that
U'(O) =oo, individualschoose never to borrow and the liquidity constraint is
never binding (see the related discussion in Zeldes, 1989b). Therefore, in the
uncertainty model, we are, in effect, preventing borrowing against the future
guaranteed consumption floor.
18parameterilatiOn:
TR5= max [0, (C+ M)—(A1(1+ r)+ Es)] (6)
We define C as the minimum level of consumption guaranteed by the
government, and will refer to this as the consumption"floor."
Transfers equal this consumption floor C plus medical expenses
minus all available resources, if that amount is positive, and zero
otherwise. In other words, transfer payments, if made, guarantee a
minimum standard of living C after medical expenses are paid.
However, transfer payments are reduced one-for-one for every dollar
of either assets or current earnings. The transfer function captures,
in a simplified way, the penalty on saving behavior of asset-based
means-tested programs such as Medicaid, AFDC, and food stamps.
Because eligibility is conditional on having assets less than a given
level, such programs place an implicit tax rate of 100 percent on
wealth above that limit. While in the model we restrict social
insurance to those with no assets at all, in practice, asset limits range
between $1000 and $3000.18
'Theasset limit for AFDC is $1000 in almost all states (it is less than
$1000 in a few states). Excluded from the assets subject to this limit are
housing equity (up to a certain limit), automobile equity (up to $1500),and, in
some states, burial insurance and plot, farm machinery andlivestock and
household furnishings. The limit for food stamps is $2000 for non-elderlyand
$3000 for elderly households, with somewhat more liberal exclusions,while for
551 the limits are $2000 for single households and $3000 for married couples,
again with somewhat less stringent exclusions on automobile equityand other
types of wealth. Eligibility for SSI or AFDC is usually a necessary
precondition to qualify for Medicaid. See Committee on Waysand Means
(1991). For simplicity, we assume that the wealth limit is zero overthe entire
year.
19Before we examine the effects of uncertainty and social
insurance programs on wealth accumulation in the general model, we
present some two-period models to provideintuition. Consider first
.a two-period certainty model, with all medical expenses aswell as
initial assets set equal to zero. Suppose that E1 > C, so that the
household is not eligible for transfers in the first period, but that B2
CC,so it is at least potentially eligible for transfers in the second
period. To see the effect of the consumption floor, consider the
expression for second period consumption:
C2 =(E1 —Cj(1+r) +E2 ÷TR2 (7)








Thus, consuming one less unit today yields (1 +r)extraunits
tomorrow if the household is not participating in the transfer
program tomorrow (the usual intertemporal tradeoff), but zero extra
units if it is.
The indifference curves and budget constraints for two
different levels of initial resources E1 (including any initial assets)
20are shown in Figure 2.19 For this example, we assume homothetic
utility and r=5=E2=O!° First consider the case of a lower-wealth
household with initial resources of E1. The budget constraint when
the consumption floor equals C is given by mnbE1.Aninterior
solution leads to a, where C1 =C2. Because of the nonconvexity of
the budget constraint, there exists another possible solution to the
problem: the household could consume all of income today so that
the guaranteed consumption level is received in the second period.
This possible solution is indicated by b. Since b is preferred to d
(U > Ut), the global optimum is b. Individuals with low initial
resources will save nothing and instead rely on the consumption
floor in the second period.
At the higher level of income, E, however, the budget line
is rsbE, and the interior solution a dominates the alternative of
b" since U > UTh Thus, individuals with somewhat higher initial
resources choose not to rely on the consumption floor and therefore
must save to finance future desired consumption.
The solution to this two-period model is as follows: For
levels of wealth (or earnings) that are low, but greater than C, the
slope of the consumption-wealth profile is one —allwealth is
consumed. At some critical level of wealth, consumption drops
sharply, so that at higher wealth, the consumption function reverts to
a straight line through the origin with a slope of 0.5; that is, half of
'We thank Eric Engen for pointing out this graphical interpretation.





Figure 2: Optimal Consumption with a Welfare 'Floor
/
—/
cr C = E*1 Clthe wealth is consumed in the first period, half in the second, just as
it would be in the absence of the transfer program.
This example thus has implications for the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth. As shown in Figure 2, a low
level of initial resources E implies consumption c;.Arise in initial
resources to E, however, causes consumption to decline to Cr.
That is, over this range of wealth, the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth can actually be negative as the household
switches from a regime of consuming all income to one in which it
saves for the future.2' This is in sharp contrast to standard models
in which consumption is always increasing in wealth.
One way to generalize this result is to expand the time
horizon to three or more periods .Asecond way to generalize the
There is a clear parallel here with the studies of labor supply with
nonconvex budget constraints by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman
(1981), Moffitt (1986), and Moffitt and Rothschild (1987). As they noted, in a
static choice model of leisure and market goods, transfer programs often create
kinked budget constraints and can generate multiple local maxima.
22Assume that both second- and third-period earnings are less than the
consumption floor, but that first-period earnings exceed the floor. In this case,
there are three local optima. The individual can: (I) forego transfer payments
altogether and choose the traditional interior solution (so that the MPC out of
resources is 1/3),(ii)receive transfers only in the third period, so that an interior
Euler equation solution holds between first- and second-period consumption (so
that the MPC out of resources is or (iii) receive transfers in both the
second and third periods (so that the MPC out of resources is unity). Finding
the global solution to this model involves choosing the one of these three
potential solutions that maximizes utility. For the details of this, see the
Appendix.
The result that the MPC depends on the effective horizon of the
consumer also appears in model with a borrowing constraint. However, the
important difference between the two models is the motivation for consuming
(continued...)
22two-period model is to add uncertainty about second-period resources
E2. For now, think of E2 as earningsless out-of-pocket medical
expenses, so the uncertainty maybe attributable to either source.
Suppose that there were a 50-percent chanceof a "good" realization,
F28, and a 50-percent chance of a"bad" realization E. Continue to
assume that r =6=0and that utility is homothetic. Let E1 ÷E,>
2C, so the individual could save enough to avoid thefloor even in
the "worst case," if so desired. The maximization problem with
respect to C1 becomes:
max,U(C1)
+ — C1+E28)(1 —Q28) + CQ28] (10)
+ - C1+ETh)(l-Q2b)+CQ21J+
wherethe first two expressions in brackets are consumption in the
good state, C2g.andconsumption in the bad state, C, The indicator
values Q,andQ28takeon the value of one when income transfers
are received under the bad and good scenario, respectively. The first-
22(. .continued)
all of one's wealth. In the model with borrowing constraints, one saves nothing
because of high anticipated future earnings. In this model, one saves nothing
because of the low anticipated future earnings relative to the consumption floor.
Including more (and thus shorter) time periods leads to smoother
consumption-wealth functions. However, at least in the case of a continuous
time certainty model, one can show that the marginal propensity to consume
wealth may still be (smoothly) negative in the presence of means-tested social
insurance.




Underuncertainty, the first-order conditions indicate a
tradeoff between the marginal utility of consuming an extra dollar
today and the expected marginal benefit of saving the dollarfor the
future. In future states of the world in which the household receives
a transfer, an extra dollar carried over fromthe previous period is
worthless to the household, because it leads to a one dollar reduction
in transfers, leaving future consumption unchanged at t.Inthe
Appendix, we describe the solution to this problem,and show that
there exist three local maxima, two of which are interior solutions
that satisfy the Euler equation. We also show that households with
higher initial resources are more likely to choose thesolution that
involves much higher saving and a lower probability of receiving
transfers. Thus, optimal consumption can again decline as wealth
increases over some ranges. Finally, we show that the welfare
program affects the savingof those households who have some
probability of receiving transfers, even if, a post, they never
receive transfers.
Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that, if we
assume that the period utility function has a positivethird derivative
(which induces precautionary saving in the presenceof earnings
uncertainty), there are two distinct effects of introducing anasset-
based means-tested social insurance program. One effect comes
24from the provision of the transfer, and would be present even if the
program involved noasset-based means testing. The government is
providing a transfer that raises income in the bad states of the world.
This serves to reduce the precautionary motive and causes
households (particularly low lifetime income households) to save
less. The second effect comes from the asset test itself. The
government effectively imposes a 100-percent tax on assetsin the
event that the household receives a health-expense or earnings shock
large enough to make it eligible to receive the transfer. This tax
further reduces desired saving, again primarily for low-lifetime-
income households. In the model used in this paper, we consider the
joint effect of these channels on households' consumption.
IV.PARAMETERIZATION AND SOLUTION OF THE
MULTIPERIOD MODEL
In this section, we begin by describing the utility function
and parameterization of the model. These are described more fully
in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b). We then examine the
empirical magnitude of the consumption "floor," and close with a
discussion of the numerical solution to the dynamic programming
problem.
When we estimate empirical parameters characterizing
uncertainty, our primary interest is in uninsured risk —thatis, the
risk faced by households conditional on existing insurance coverage.
In the model, for example, the effect of uncertainty in lifespan on
saving is conditional on a preexisting pension and Social Security
25payment that acts as a partial annuity. Similarly, ourestimates of
uncertainty with respect to health expenses condition on preexisting
private insurance and Medicare, and are therefore based only on the
uninsured out-of-pocket risk.
A. Parameterization of the Model
The Utility Function. We assume that the period utility




We assume a value for y of 3, which is consistent with many
empirical studies. The rate of time preference 6 is assumed to be 3
percent per annum for all education groups, and the real after-tax
rate of interest is assumed to be 3 percent per annum?
Lifespan Uncertainty. We use mortality probabilities based
on mortality data (from 1980) as a function of sex and age from the
National Center for Health Statistics and the Social Security
Administration (Faber, 1982). Calculating mortality probabilities for
a representative family is problematic, given the mixture of married
and single households. We use the mortality probabilities for
23The coefficient y serves multiple roles in this utility function: y is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, (1/7) is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption and (7+1) is the coefficient of relative prudence
(Kimball, 1990b). The third derivative of this utility function is positive,which
will generate precautionary saving in response to uncertainty regarding earnings
and out-of-pocket medical expenses.
24We review empirical estimates of -,'andpresent sensitivity analyses using
alternative values of and ô in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b).
26women. These capture both the expectationsof life for single
women, and the expectation of lifefor a currently married family in
which the husband dies first. The maximum possible agein the
model is set to 100; since we assume economic life begins at age 21,
there are a maximum of 80 periods in the model.
Earnings Process. Time-series patterns of earningsand
wages have been the subjectof many studies (see e.g., Lillard and
Willis, 1978; MaCurdy, 1982; and Abowd and Card, 1989).Our
measures of earnings risk differ in two general respects. First, we
include unemployment insurance and subtract taxes in our measure
of "earnings"; these adjustments are likely to reduce earnings
variability.r Second, we separate our sample into three
educational categories.
Earnings during working years are uncertain and correlated
over time and follow
=ZJ3 ÷u.+vft (13)
= pu1+
wherey14 is the log of earnings, 4isa cubic polynomial in age and
year dummy variables (included to control for cohort productivity
growth) and /3 is a vector of coefficients. The error term u follows
an AR(I) process, where e1 is a white-noise innovation. The
variable Uftisa combination of i.i.d. transitory variation in earnings
Carroll (1992) also included transfer payments in his measure of earnings
for the same reason. In our model, means-tested transfers such as AFDC and
food stamps are excluded from the definition of earnings because they are
received only if assets are sufficiently low. Instead, they are included in the
consumption floor.
27and measurement error. To simplify the dynamic programming
model, we assume that u is entirely measurement error and ignore it
in our parameterization of the model. Hence our measure of
earnings uncertainty is conservative because it excludes all transitory
variation in earnings. We assume in the model that the head of the
household retires at age 65, at which point the family receives Social
Security, pensions, and other non-asset income with certainty.
Estimates of the uncertainty parameters are summarized in
the top panel of Table 2! The results imply substantial persistence
in shocks to earnings, a result that is consistent with many of the
studies cited above. In addition, the log of labor income is more
variable for non-high-school graduates than it is for the two other
educational groups.
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses. We use data from a
merged sample of observations from the 1977 National Health Care
Expenditure Survey and the 1977 National Nursing Home Survey to
calculate a cross-sectional distribution of out-of-pocket medical
expenses. Our measure of medical costs includes expenses paid by
Medicaid, because Medicaid payments are determined endogenously
in our model as the difference between total medical costs arid
available financial resources of the family.
We assume a model of medical spending of the following
26When we estimate the uncertainty parameters in (13) (o, p,a),we
exclude households with very low earnings realizations. When we estimate the
mean age-earnings profile, we estimate the equations in levels rather than togs,
and include alt households. Details of the estimation approach are given in
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b).
28Table 2: Parameters for Uncertain Earnings and







AR(1) coefficient (p) 0.955 0.954 0.959









AIt(l) coefficient(pJ 0.901 0.901 0.901
Vatiance of the innovationt 0.175 0.156 0.153
Nosa: Sec equation (12) forthe time-series model of earnings and equation (13)1cr the Sc-series uSe1of
mit-of-pocket medical expenses.
'Based on 1977 cross section study of the National Health Care Expendilure Survey and the 1977 National
Nursing Home Survey. and data and estimation methods in Feenberg and Skinner (1992). 5cc HubbanI Skinner.




wherem is the log of medical expenses, w is the purely transitory
component, assumed to be entirely measurement error, lit follows an
AR(l) process (where e, is a white-noise innovation), and G1 is a
quadratic in age and an individual fixed effect. We estimate
separately for elderly individuals aged 65 years or over and the
nonelderly. The estimates are presented in the bottom part of Table
2. The merged cross-section data set enables us to estimate more
accurately the cross-sectional distribution of medical spending by
education group and by age, but not the time-series properties of
medical expenses. Instead, we use estimates of PmfromFeenberg
and Skinner (1992), who use a quadrivariate tobit procedure with a
panel of tax data from 1968 to 1973 to measure the time-series
pattern of declared medical spending (in excess of 3 percent of
adjusted gross income). There is surprisingly little difference in the
overall level of medical spending by education group, implying that
average medical expenses are a larger fraction of lifetime income for
low education groups. This is in part because of the much higher
Medicaid spending for the lower education groups.
Consumption Floor. Finally, the consumption floor is
defined as the level of consumption guaranteed by the government
above and beyond medical expenses. Measuring the means-tested
consumption floor is difficult, since potential payments from social
insurance programs differ dramatically according to the number of
29children, marital status, age, and even the recipient's state or city.
Nevertheless, we make a first approximation by calculating separate
consumption floors for "representative" families both under age 65
and over 65. Details of the calculation are in Appendix A of
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994b) and are largely based on
figures in Committee on Ways and Means (1991).
We include in our estimate of the floor only means-tested
transfer payments such as AFDC, food stamps, and Section 8
housing assistance for those under age 65, and SSI, food stamps, and
Section 8 housing assistance for those over age 65.'
Unemployment insurance is not included in these transfers because it
is not means-tested; instead, it is included in net earnings. Medicaid
is also not included as part of the floor because it is used exclusively
to pay for medical expenses.
We distinguish between entitlement and non-entitlement
programs. Under entitlement programs, everyone who is eligible
may sign up. Despite the fact that many who are eligible do not
take advantage of the program, the money is at leat potentially
available to them. Housing subsidies are not entitlements, since
there are often waiting lists. In such cases, we include the expected
value of benefits --i.e.,the probability of receiving the benefits
times the dollar amount, in our estimate of the floor.
27Weassume these benefits are valued by recipients at their dollar cost.
Moffitt (1989) estimates that food stamps can largely be valued as cash, and
Section 8 housing subsidies are unlikely to distort consumption behavior given
that the vouchers are generally for an amount less than market rent.
30For the nonelderly, the median AFDC and food-stamp
transfers to a female-headed family in 1984 with two children and no
outside earnings or assets was $5764.Therepresentative family is
assumed to include a single parent with children; if the father were
present in the household, or married to the mother, then benefits
would be reduced in some states of residence. We assume that
housing subsidies are received entirely from the Section 8 housing
program, which provides housing vouchers for existing rental
property. The mean housing subsidy paid is multiplied by 0.35 to
adjust for the fact that only 35 percent of the eligible population who
actually receive the Section 8 housing subsidy. Hence the net
(expected) housing subsidy is $1173. Summing AFDC and housing
subsidies yields a combined "safety net" for the non-elderly of
$6937.
For the elderly, a weighted average of single and married
families implies that combined 551 and food stamp annual payments
in 1984 were $5400, inclusive of median state supplements. Adding
Section 8 housing benefits for elderly families yields a net total
"safety net" of $6893. Because the measures for the elderly and
nonelderly are close to $7000, we adopt a common value for both
groups of $7000 for the consumption floor, C.
For a number of reasons, this estimate should be treated with
caution. Calculating the consumption floor for individuals in nursing
homes, for whom SSI is reduced to only $30 per month for spending
money, is difficult because it involves valuing the roomand board
provided by the nursing home. The "safety net" for a couple with
31grown childrenin their fifties, before they are eligible toreceive
SSI, is likely to be much lessthan the $7000floorassumed above.
Furthermore, in using expected valuesof housing subsidies, we
ignore the more complicated problemof uncertainty about the value
of the consumption floor faced by potentialrecipients.
B. Numerical Solution of the DynamicModel
Because we cannot solve thehousehold's multiperiod
problem analytically, we usenumerical stochastic dynamic program-
ming techniques to approximateclosely the solution. Using these
methods, we calculate explicit decisionrules for optimal
consumption as well as the valuefunction.
As noted above, earnings and medical expendituresare
assumed to follow first-order autoregressive processesaround a
deterministic trend. The deviation from thetrend is discretized into
9 discrete nodes, with a maximum and minimum equalto plus and
minus 2.5standarddeviations of the unconditional distribution.
Hence earnings and health deviations fromtrend are first-order
Markov processes, with the probability of realizing a givendiscrete•
outcome in period t+ 1 afunction of the current outcome in period t.
Wedivide the maximum feasible range for cash onhand (X)ineach
period into 61 "nodes." The nodes are evenly spacedon the basis of
the log of cash on hand, in order to get finer intervals atlower
absolute levels of cash on hand, where nonlinearities inthe
consumption function are most likely.
The dynamic program therefore has three statevariables in
32addition to age: cash on hand, earnings, and medical expenses?
The problem is solved by starting in the last possible period of life
(T) and solving backward. In period T, C,.equalsX,.Inperiods
prior to T, we calculate optimal consumption for each possible
combination of nodes, using stored information about the subsequent
period's optimal consumption and value function. We do not
discretize consumption, but allow it to be a continuous variable.
Because of possible multiple local maxima, we use information about
both the value function and expected marginal utility in our search
for optimal consumption. Optimal consumption is calculated by
searching for levels of consumption that maximize the value function
and that (with the exception of corner solutions) equate the marginal
utility of consumption at t to the (appropriately discounted) expected
marginal utility of consumption in period t+1.Solvingthe
household's problem numerically involves extensive computation?
Once we determine the optimal consumption function for all
possible nodes, we simulate a history for each of a large number of
families (16,000). For each family, we use the following procedure.
28Inyears after retirement, the earnings state variable is a trivial one,
leaving us with two state variables.
29Intotal, optimal consumption is calculated at more than 230,000
individual wealth-health-earnings-age nodes. Each optimal consumption
calculation involves searching over a large number of consumption choices, and
the expected marginal utility and value function must be calculated for each of
these possible choices. All computer work was performed using the vectorizing
capabilities of the Cornell National Supercomputer Facility, a resource of the
Cornell Theory Center, funded by the National Science Foundation, the IBM
corporation, the state of New York, and members of the Corporate Research
Institute.
33In any period, we begin with the level of assetsfrom the previous
period and multiply by (1 +r).Wedraw random realizations for
earnings and medical expenses fromthe appropriate distributions.3°
We then add the realized earnings and subtract therealized medical
expenses, resulting in avalue for cash on hand. Since realized cash
on hand will not generally be equal to oneof the nodes for cash on
hand, we interpolate the optimal consumption function, usingthe two
nearest nodes for cash on hand, for the given levelsof earnings and
medical expenses. This gives us the realized value for consumption.
Subtracting this consumption from cash on hand gives usend-of-
period assets. We then follow each family over time,recording the
realized levels of earnings, consumption, and assets for each period.
V. SIMULATED DISTRIBUTIONS OF AGE-WEALTH
PROFILES
We begin by presenting the wealth accumulation pattern of a
model in which the mean values of medical expenditures and
earnings are anticipated with certainty, and lifespan is alsocertain.
In this certainty benchmark, consumption and wealth paths differ
across education groups, but are identical within eacheducational
group. We examine whether differences inthe age profile of
medical expenses, earnings, and retirement income can explain the
observed (average) differences in wealth accumulation.
3°Wedraw a starting value for earnings and medical expenses for period I
from a log-normal distribution with variance equal to the unconditional variance
of the distributions. Subsequent draws for medical expenses and for earnings
(through retirement) are drawn from the conditional distributions.
34The earnings, health, consumption, and wealth profiles for
the lowest and highest education groups are shown in Figures 3(a)
and 3(b). Again, the graphs are scaled to adjust for differences in
lifetime income across education groups. Consider first the lowest
education group. The household's consumption is limited by
borrowing constraints until its mid-thirties. After that point, it
accumulates wealth, arriving at a level of wealth at retirement of
about five times peak earnings, and then gradually spends down
accumulated wealth. Next consider the highest education group.
The wealth-age path is very similar to that for the lowest education
group. That is, differences in the profile of earnings and retirement
income cannot explain the differences in mean wealth-income ratios
between the lowest and highest education groups. While households
with lower levels of income may experience higher replacement rates
from social security benefits (and hence less need to save for
retirement), they are also less likely to receive pension income. On
balance, pension plus Social Security income yield a similar fraction
of pre-retirement earnings for the two education groups, leading to
similar wealth-income profiles.
In order to analyze not just mean wealth profiles, but the
distribution of wealth for different groups (given our assumption of
homogenous preferences), we need to examine a model with
uncertainty. Therefore, we next examine the predictions of the
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—uncertainty,3' but with a minimal guaranteed consumption floor of
$1000. In this case, there is little difference in the wealth
accumulation patterns of the lowest and the highest lifetime-income
groups. Tabulations in Table 3 compare ;he fraction of families with
wealth less than income in the PSID (the first column) and the
simulated data (the second column). For the simulated data based on
a $1000 consumption floor, each educational group has virtually the
same small fraction of "low wealth" households. Furthermore, this
precautionary saving model dramatically underpredicts the proportion
of "low wealth" households, especially for those without college
degrees.32
Finally, we consider the most realistic specification: a social
insurance program that guarantees a $7000 consumption floor.33
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) depict the predicted wealth accumulation
patterns for the two educational categories. These wealth profiles
are taken from 16,000 households simulated for each education
"In this version of the model, accidental bequests arising from lifespan
uncertainty are effectively confiscated, since no other generation receives them.
Experiments in which the average (education-group-specific) bequest was given
to members of the next generation at the beginning of their working lives
yielded higher steady-state asset-income ratios. However, this approach
provides younger generations with an unrealistically large initial stock of assets.
An alternative approach would have younger generations face uncertain future
inheritances. This more general model is a topic for future research.
32Similarly,Carroll and Sainwick (1992) have shown that wealth
accumulation in the conventional precautionary saving model is implausibly
high for individuals with low time preference rates.
Note that we are varying the minimum guaranteed level of consumption
(the consumption "floor"). In this paper, we do not consider changes in the
asset limit, which is assumed for simplicity to be zero in our model.






































































Notes to Figures 4(a) - 4(b): Predicted 20th through BOth percentilesof the wealth
distribution, expressed as cubic polynomials in age, arealso shown. The vertical axis
measures the ratio of reported individual net wealthto (education-specific) average
permanent income. Average permanent income forthose without high school
degrees is $17,241, and for college graduates $32,062.The maximum (dollar) wealth
level shown at the top of the vertical axis is thirteen times permanentincome.
Wealth data are simulated using the dynamic programmingmodel described in the
text.



























2b 3'Ogroup and aredrawn to the same scale, and with the same quintile
regressions, as the graphs in Figure Consider first the graph
for college graduates, Figure 4(b). The quintile regressionsfor the
simulated age-wealth profiles match closely theactual wealth profiles
in Figure 1(c), for all of the quintilesY Note in particular that in
both the actual data, and the data simulated by the model,there is
substantial wealth accumulation for the bottom quintile.For
example, simple tabulations show that the 20th-percentilelevel of
wealth among those aged 50-59 is 2.4 years of (permanent)income
in the PSID, and 2.8 years in the simulated data. In general,this
model with uncertainty about earnings, medical expenses,and length
of life does a good job at explaining the distribution ofwealth for
this group.
Next consider the graph for those with no high school
degree, Figure 4(a). In the simulated data,wealth for the bottom
20th percentile of this group is bunched near zero for all ages, just
as it is in the actual PSID data in Figure 1(a). For example,the
Although we have calculated the entire lifetime wealth profilefor each of
these households, we chose only one randomly selected wealth-age combination
per household to replicate a cross-sectional sample.
We have used cubic polynomials in age to summarize the quantile
distributions. These cubic approximations, however, may be inadequatein
summarizing wealth distributions for given age groups, which maybe better
revealed using nonparametric approaches. These more detailed comparisons
(shown in the Appendix) suggest that at the ages of peak wealth,the simulation
model tends to overpredict wealth accumulation for the higher quantiles.For
example, the actual 60th-percentile level of net wealth (fromthe PSID) among
college-educated households at age 50-59 is $216,000,while the simulated 60th-
percentile wealth level for the same age group is $278,000.
37tabulated 20th-percentile level of wealth among those aged 50-59is
very low: 0.25 years of (permanent) income in the PSID data and
0.35 years in the simulated data. That is, the model is capable of
explaining one of the key "puzzles" in the data --unlikethe high-
lifetime-income group, a significant fraction of the middle-aged low-
lifetime-income group has virtually no wealth.
In the third column of Table 3, we present the fraction of
households with wealth less than income in the two education groups
for the higher value of the consumption floor. The entries generally
correspond closely to figures tabulated from the PSID. For
example, the simulated percentages of "low wealth" households at
age 50-59 are 24.5 percent and 4.9 percent for no-high-school and
college-educated households, respectively, compared with the
corresponding actual PSID tabulations of 30.0 and 4.6 percent. To
summarize, the simulation model replicates well the wide disparity
by lifetime-income group in the fraction of households with low
levels of wealth.
Finally, Table 4 documents the fraction of households
receiving means-tested transfers, based on 1984 data from the PSID,
by age and by education group. The tabulations from the PSID data,
in the first column, are contrasted with the simulated percentages
given a consumption floor of $1000 (the second column) and $7000
(the third column). Assuming a consumption floor of $1000 implies
that few households in either education group receive means-tested
transfers. By contrast, a $7000 consumption floor implies that a
much larger percentage of households with lower levels of




























































Note: "Positivetransfers" means that the family received AFDC. SSI, or food stamps.
Source:Dataare from the 1984 PSID and authors' calculations.educational attainment receive transfers, with little effecton college-
educated households. For example, atages 50-59, the actual
percentage of households without a high school degree receiving
transfers is 12.7. The simulated percentage is 10.7 with a $7000
floor, but only 0.2 percent with a $1000 floor. Few college-
educated households receive transfers at anyage. Overall, the
simulated model with a $7000 floor closely matchesage- and
education-related patterns of income transfer receipts.
The dynamic programming model with a $7000 floor
generally predicts accurately differences in wealth accumulation
patterns across education groups. However, it performs poorly in
two respects. First, the model overpredicts the fraction of "low
wealth't college-educated households at youngerages (Table 3).
Because of the more steeply sloped earnings profile for college-
educated households, the simulation model predicts thatmany of
these households will possess very little wealth prior toage 40. This
contrasts with the actual patterns from the PSID, perhaps because of
inter vivos transfers. Second, the simulated 60th and 80th percentile
age-wealth profile for households with low education levels are
considerably higher than the corresponding actual profile from the
PSID. For example, for ages 50-59, the 60th percentile of wealth in
the PSID is $59,000, compared to the 60th-percentile value in the
simulated data of $147,000.
With a conventional utility function and empirically
consistent parameters for earnings and health expenses, our
simulation model predicts a large impact on wealth accumulation of
39means-tested welfare programs. Wehave presented evidence that
our model is consistentwith important features of the empirical
distribution of wealth. Is thereadditional direct empirical evidence
that can shed light on whetherdifferences in the structure of
government-provided assistance programscan predict empirical
differences in saving behavior as ourmodel suggests?
A formal statistical test of how governmentsocial insurance
programs affect savingbehavior is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, we consider below two typesof evidence that may
bear on the empirical issue of howsocial insurance affects wealth
accumulation: the first based on historicaltrends in social insurance
policy in the United States,and the second based on cross-sectional
differences in saving behavior, either by states orby income groups.
In our approach, all else equal, an expansionin the
magnitude of means-tested socialinsurance programs (measured by
an increase in )shouldreduce wealth holdings of low-lifetime-
income households, while having little effect onwealth holdings of
high-lifetime-income households. The reasonis that, on account of
the increase in C,low-lifetime-income
households face a greater likelihood of participatingin the
government consumption-maintenance programsand reduce their
saving accordingly.
To examine this prediction, one wouldneed to examine
differences in the distribution of assets bylifetime-income groups in
periods with "low" values of the consumptionfloor C and periods
with "high" values of the consumption floor.One might think that a
40good natural experiment would be a comparison of the early 1960s
with a more recent period such as the 1980s. Detailed wealth data
are available in the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. The size of
means-tested programs expanded substantially between 1962 and
1983, with expenditures more than one and one-half times their 1962
level by 1983. Real spending on means-tested in-kind transfers
(food stamps, housing subsidies, and Medicaid) rose even more
dramatically over the 1962-1983 period (see Burtless, 1986; and
Eliwood and Summers, 1986).
However, there are at least two problems with this as a
natural experiment. First, there are a large number of other factors
that have changed between the 1960s and the 198Os) Second, the
real benefits from AFDC and food stamps for a single mother with a
family of four rose by only 5.2percent,from $6612 to $6957 (in
1984 dollars), between 1964 and 1984. The increase in total
"Factors other than the consumption floor were not constant over the 1962-
1983 period. For example, average real out-of-pocket medical expenses for the
elderly has risen from $962 in 1966 to $1562 in 1984, which was also likely
accompanied by an increase in the varianceofsuch out-of-pocket expenses.
(See U.S. Congress. Select Committee on Aging, House of Representatives,
"Emptying the Elderly's Pockethook -GrowingImpact of Rising Health Care
Costs1" Comm. Pub.No. 101-76, page 25. Our calculation is expressed in
1984 dollars; we adjust from 1966 data using the CPI-U.) Increased out-of-
pocket health expenses could. lead to greater saving while young in anticipation
of future medical expenses, but could also discourage saving by those with
greater potential eligibility for Medicaid. In addition, there may be greater
uncertainty about the growth rate of earnings across education groups.
especially given the divergence during the 1980s in earnings for those without
high school education relative to those with a college education (see Levy and
Murnane, 1992). Finally, the asset limits for the programs we examine were
changed significantly between 1962 and 1983 (see Powers, 1993).
41expenditures arose from a rapid growth in enrollment rather than a
rapid increase in benefits conditional on receiving them.
Unfortunately, in its present form our model does not incorporate
the changes in family composition, eligibility requirements, or
welfare "stigma" that may account for the rapid rise in enrollment in
welfare programs and hence the greater likelihood of receiving
welfare payments.
Though not reported in detail here, we compared patterns of
wealth holdings using the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics
of Consumers (SFCC) and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF).37 To control for differences in educational attainment
between 1962 and 1983, we defined the low-lifetime-income group
to be the bottom quintile of educational attainment (in 1983, the
group who had not completed high school) and the high lifetime-
income group to be the top quartile of educational attainment (in
1983, college graduates). The data did not show large differences in
wealth between the two periods. For example, among households
with heads aged 46-60, median wealth fell from 3.8 percent of
household income in 1962 to 1.9 percent in 1983. For households
of the same age with high lifetime income, median wealth as a
percentage of income rose from 34.8 percent to 36.3 percent. In
sum, changes in median wealth accumulation between 1962 and 1983
"Fora description of the 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances, see
Projector and Weiss (1963); for a description of the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finances, see Avery and Kennickell (1987).
42were not large.38
Preliminary cross-section evidence on how asset-based means
testing affects wealth accumulation is more supportive of our model.
Powers (1994) used data on female-headed households in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Women to exploit cross-sectional
(state-level) variation in AFDC policy to identify effects of asset
limits on wealth levels. In particular, Powers fmds that, for two
otherwise identical female-headed households who reside in different
states, a one-dollar differential in the AFDC asset limit is associated
with a 30-cent difference in assets.39 Moreover, the size of this
estimated effect is qualitatively robust to a number of alternative
specifications.
Another implication of our analysis is that low wealth
holdings by low-lifetime-income households are likely to be an
"absorbing state" because of asset-based means testing of welfare
programs. In Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994a), we compare
the persistence of wealth holdings for households in the 1984 and
1989 samples of the PSID. Simulated five-year transition
probabilities from our model with uninsured idiosyncratic risks and a
means-tested consumption floor of $7000 replicate very closely the
380ne potential problem with comparing the 1962 andthe1983 Surveys is
changes in the accuracy of wealth reporting. For example, Wolff (1987)
detailed substantial deviations between the aggregates in the 1962 SFCC and the
aggregate household balance sheets.
39powers includes lagged assets in her model with an estimated coefficient
not statistically significantly different from unity. Hence, one might interpret
her results as corroborating an important effect of asset limits on saving.
43.observed transition probabilities in the PSID. Resultsof alternative
simulations with a high annual rate of time preference (10 percent)
and no consumption floor --designedto mimic a "buffer stock"
approach --greatlyoverpredicted the likelihood of a recovery from
low levels of wealth.
VI.CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
Empirical studies using micro data oftenfind a significant
group in the populationwith virtually no wealth, raising concerns
about heterogeneity in motives for saving. In particular,this
heterogeneity has been interpreted as evidence againstthe life-cycle
model of saving. This paper argues that a life-cycle model can
replicate observed patterns in householdwealth accumulation once
one accounts for precautionary saving motivesand social insurance
programs. This suggests that a properly specifiedlife-cycle model
with precautionary saving and social insurance can be useful for
analyzing determinants of household saving and particularlyfor
assessing effects of certain social insurance programs on saving.
Our reconciliation of the generalized life-cycle model with
observed patterns of household wealth accumulation proceeds in two
steps. First, we show how social insurance programswith asset-
based means testing can discourage saving by households withlow
expected lifetime incomes. The implicit tax bias against savingin
this context is significant relative to other areas of tax and
expenditure policy, since saving and wealth are subject to animplicit
44tax rate of 100 percent in the event of a sufficiently large earnings
downturn or medical expense.
Second, we evaluate this model of saving and social
insurance using a large dynamic programming model with four state
variables. Assuming common preference parameters across
education groups, we are able to replicate along important
dimensions actual wealth accumulation patterns for both lower-and
higher-lifetime-income families. The results presented here
complement those presented in Hubbard, Skinner,and Zeldes
(1994b), in which we argue that a life-cycle modelwith
precautionary saving motives and social insurance can explain
aggregate wealth accumulation andobserved co-movements of
changes in consumption and current income.
In particular, we find that the presence of asset-based means-
testing of welfare programs can imply that a significantfraction of
the group with lower lifetime income will not accumulatewealth.
The reason is that saving and wealth are subject to an implicit tax
rate of 100 percent in the event of a earnings downturn ormedical
expense large enough to causethe household to seek welfare
support. This effect is much weakerfor those with higher lifetime
income for two reasons. First, the consumption floor is amuch
smaller fraction of their lifetime income and normal consumption
levels, and hence represents a less palatable support program.
Second, the uninsured risks of medical spending are asmaller
fraction of lifetime resources. These results suggest thatobserved
empirical behavior of lower income groups that might appear
45inconsistent with the life-cycle model (Bernheini and Scholz, 1993),
may in fact beconsistent with optimizing behavior.
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions inthe
model that may affect the results we present here. First, wedo not
control for family compositional changes. Children are likely to
increase levels of consumption at middle age, which can generate
low levels of wealth accumulation independent of means-testedsocial
insurance programs. For example, Blundell, Browning,and Meghir
(1994) suggest that household demographics are a significant
explanation of the hump-shaped consumption profile commonly
observed in cohort and cross-section data. However, their dataalso
suggest that the average number of childrenin a family peaks past
age 35. Hence, households anticipatingfuture child-rearing expenses
(and college expenses) might actually save more while young,which
would explain why the empirical data indicates more saving at young
ages than that implied by our simulationmodel. Our model also
does not account for life-cycle changes at older ages, and in
particular the role of self-insurance against lifespan uncertainty by
married elderly couples and their children (see, e.g.,Kotlikoffand
Spivak, 1981). Allowing for a richer demographic modelof
consumption might therefore reduce the predicted level ofoverall
wealth accumulation because of greater demand for consumption
while middle-aged and less demand while retired.
Second, we ignore bequests in the model. Allowingfor
bequests is likely to increase the overall level of wealthaccumulation
in the simulation model (see for example, Hubbard, Skinner, and
46Zeldes, 1994b), and may allow a better explanation of saving
behavior of the very wealthy. However, including bequests is
unlikely to affect our fundamental conclusions about the nature of
wealth accumulation at lower income levels. Most people who are
potentially eligible for means-tested welfare programs are unlikely to
be leaving substantial bequests.
• To conclude, the economically significant role in saving
decisions by low-income households played by assct-based means
testing of many social insurance programs suggests its relevance for
public policy discussions of welfare and social insurance. A model
such as this can be particularly helpful in evaluating the effects of
welfare reform (such as changing the guaranteed level of
consumption or the size of the asset limit) on saving by both current
and potential future recipients. More broadly, deliberation of the
consequences of introducing asset-based means testing for Social
Security should also focus on the incentive effects emphasized here.
47APPENDIX
Optimal Consumption in Two-Period andThree-Period Models
With Certain Earnings
The Lagrangian for the basic two-period problem outlined in
the text can be written: where Q2isan indicator variable that equals
U(C)2+
1+5





L 1+r 1÷rj L1+rj
+ — C1),
unity when the individual is receiving a transfer, and zerootherwise,
X is the marginal utility of income, and jz1 is the shadow price ofthe







where U'(C) is the marginal utility with respect to period s
consumption.
Because of the nonlinearity of the budget constraint, there
exist two local maxima for the expression in (Al), one
48corresponding to Q2= 1,and the othe,r to Q= 0.Whether Q2is
positive is clearly endogenous; to find the global maximum, we find
the two local maxima (corresponding to Q= 0and Q= 1)and
then choose the larger.
Begin with Q2= 0.Because we have assumed that E2 < C,
in order to not receive the transfer the household must have saved
resources from period 1; i.e., Q2= 0implies jt1= 0.Thus, the
first-order conditions have the standard interior solution: U'(C1) =
U'(C2)(1 + r)/( 1+6). When Q2= 1,so that the household receives a
transfer in period 2, the first-order condition is U'(C1) =.t. The
household will consume all of its resources in the first period and
rely on the consumption floor in the second period.
Figure 2 in the text showed the budget constraints and
indifference curves for this two-period problem. Figure Al provides
a different view of the problem facing the consumer. On the
horizontal axis is first-period consumption, and on the vertical axis is
marginal utility of consumption. The downward sloping curve
measures the marginal utility of C1, which is continuous everywhere.
The other, initially upward sloping, curve FF' is equal to
U'(C2)(l-Q2)/(1 +6) + ,.4°Thetwo intersections of these curves
correspond to the two local maxima described above. Point a again
corresponds to the interior solution (with Q= 0);at this point FF'
°Theanalytic derivation of FF' comes by substituting U'(C,)(l +r)/(l +6)
for X in the first line of equation (13). This optimality condition can then be
broken into twoparts;U'(C1) and (minus) the remainder, which is denoted by












Cis upward-sloping, since as C1 rises, C2 falls, so that U'(C2) rises.
When C, is high enough that saving the remainder wouldcause C2 to
equal C, the "opportunity cost" of additional first-period
consumption drops to zero. At this point dC2/dC1 =0,so any
additional saving is effectively completely confiscated due to the
consumption maintenance program, and it makes no sense for an
individual to save any additional dollars. Finally, at C1 =E1,the
borrowing constraint binds, so that U'(C,) is equal to the shadow
price ,.Thealternative solution is therefore b. Whether point b is
preferred to point a cannot be answered without knowing the shape
of the utility function over the entire range of consumption.
The solution to this model is shown in Figure A2(a). For
levels of wealth (or earnings) that are low, but greater than C, the
slope of the consumption-wealth profile is one --allwealth is
consumed. Above E, the consumption function reverts to the
traditional interior solution with a slope of 0.5; that is, half of the
wealth is consumed in the first period, half in the second.
One way to generalize this result is to expand the time
horizon to three periods.4' Assume that both second- and third-
period earnings are less than the consumption floor, but that first-
period earnings exceed the floor. Formally, the three-period model
can be posed as follows. The Lagrangian can be expressed as:
with the obvious generalizations from the two-period model. The
condition for Q2= 1is similar to the two-period model, while the
condition for Q3= 1is somewhat more complicated since it relies
"Itis straightforward but tedious to generalize to more than three periods.
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where X2 =((E1-C1)(1+r)+E2)(1-Q2) + QC is accumulated wealth
plus earnings plus transfer payments in period 2. Note then that
choosing C1 such that a transfer program in period 2 will occur (i.e.,
=1)makes it more likely that the individual will also choose Q
=1.As will be shown below, under the assumptions of the model,
once payments from the income transfer program are accepted in
period 2, payments will also be accepted in period 3.
51The first order conditions can be written:
U1 —X(1—Q2)(1 —Q3) j.z1
—p.(l+r)(1—Q2) =0
X(1-Q) --
2 P'2 — In
U =0.
(1+r)2
There are a number of possible strategies that involve either
receiving no income transfer payments, or receiving payments in one
or two periods. Consider the four possible combinations of Q2and
Q3:
(1)Q2= = 0corresponds to the standard interior solution
without any transfer payments. The Euler equation is given by U1 =
(1+r)U11 for i =1,2.It is possible, but unlikely, that the
individual's borrowing constraint binds in the first period (jt > 0),
and impossible for the borrowilig constraint to bind in the second
period.42
(ii) Q2= 1,Q3= 0is ruled out by assumption. If the
individual receives transfer payments in the second period, then he
or she will have no savings for the third period. Since B3 < C by
assumption, the individual will prefer C, leading to Q =1and a
contradiction.
(iii) Q2= 0,O =1occurs when an interior solution is
42 Since E3 c Cby assumption, if the borrowing constraint is binding in
the second period, the household will save nothing for the third period and will
prefer C to E3, so that Q3 =1.
52chosen in the second period, but transfers are received in the third
period. In this case, the marginal conditions between the first and
second periods generate interior solutions; U1 =U2(1+ r), but U2 =
. Thatis, consumption in the first two years are chosen as if in a
two-period model, because it makes no sense to carry over a small
amount of saving to the final period.
(iv) Q2= Q3 = 1implies that the individual will consume
all of his or her initial wealth in the first period (jz> 0)and rely
on income transfers thereafter.
Finding the global solution to this model involves choosing
the one of these three potential solutions that maximizes utility.
Which of the three feasible solutions is. a global maximum depends
on the form of the utility function, thelevel of wealth, and the size
of the guaranteed consumption floor.
The solution to the model for the case that E2 == 0is
presented in Figure A2(b). For lower levels of initial resources E1
<F,the MPC out of resources is 1.0 and all wealth is consumed
(i.e., case (iii) above). When wealth exceeds E but is less than E,
case (ii) is chosen; wealth is split evenly between period 1 and 2, so
the MPC of wealth is 1/2, and the consumption floor C is consumed
in the third period. Finally, for wealth greater than E, case (i) is
chosen; the individual chooses never to be on the floor and an
interior solution holds with the MPC out of wealth is equal to 1/3.






E* E** WealthOptimal Consumption in a Two-Period Model With Uncertain
Earnings
Figure A3 offers a graphical description of the effect of
uncertain second-period resources and social insurance on
consumption. On the horizontal axis is first-period consumption,
and on the vertical axis is the marginal utility of consumption. The
downward-sloping curve, equal to the left hand side of equation (11)
in the text, measures the marginal utility of C1, which is continuous
everywhere. The other, initially upward-sloping, curve labeled
"opportunity cost" is equal to the right-hand side of equation (11) in
the text.
The intersections of these curves represent local maxima.
Point d corresponds to the interior solution at which the household
saves enough to avoid welfare even in the worst earnings outcome
(Q= Q = 0).At the point C, the amount of saving provides
exactly C in the bad state of the world in which E, is realized. This
is not an optimal choice, because the household could consume more
C1 today, and still receive Cinthe bad state of the world, owing to
the existence of the consumption floor. Hence, the "opportunity
cost" curve drops suddenly, as the value of On,, switches from zero
to one. That is, increasing consumption today by $1 causes a
reduction in next period's consumption only if the good outcome is
realized, so the opportunity cost of $1 consumed today is just the
marginal utility of second-period consumption C,4, weighted by the
probability that the good state occurs. Point e corresponds to the
interior solution at which the household receives the consumption




Opportunity cost tfloor in the bad state of the world, but not in the good state of the
world. At C, first-period consumption is sufficiently high that in
either state of the world, the family will be eligible for the
consumption floor. The opportunity cost curve drops to zero,
because increasing C1 today by a dollar does not reduce C2. Finally,
at pointf, the household is consuming all of its resources. The
optimal consumption choice corresponds to the global utility
maximum that corresponds either to point d,e, orf.
Figure A3 can be used to analyze how an increase in
resources E1 affects the relative value of points d,e, andf.Because
of an envelope condition, the increase in utility conditional on
choosing C1 at points d,e, andfequals (approximately) the shaded
areas to the right of and below points d,e, andf, respectively.
Clearly, the value of d,savingagainst both outcomes, rises by more
than e,savingagainst just the good outcome, and the value of erises
by more thanf, making it more likely that the individual will save.
In other words, households with higher initial resources are more
likely to save for future contingencies, and hence less likely to rely
on the consumption floor. In this case of uncertainty about earnings
net of medical expenses, the wealth-consumption profile can again be
nonmonotonic.
55Details by age of the distribution of wealth
The following graphs show the weighted 20th, 4Oth 60th,
and 80th percentiles of wealth (actual PSID and simulated by the
model) for each age. These therefore show unsmoothed data, as
opposed to figures 1 and 4 in the text which showed the fitted values
for the quintile regressions.
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